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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH ANN MILLSAP, by 
and through her guardian ad 
litem, LORRAINE COWGILL, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
ALAN SOKOLOW, M. D., 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Case No. 20524 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
D I S T R I C T COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE JOHN A . ROKICH, DISTRICT JUDGE 
ISSUES FOR REVIEW 
This appeal presents only one issue for review: 
Does § 78-12-35, Utah Code Ann. (1953),V toll the medical mal-
practice statute of limitations while a prospective defendant 
1/ All statutory citations are to the Utah Code Annotated 
unless otherwise noted. 
- 2 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
is absent from the state but is still subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of its courts under the Long-Arm Statute? 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
Set forth in Addendum II are the statutory provisions 
which may be determinative of the issue presented: § 78-14-4 
(the medical malpractice statute of limitations); § 78-12-35 
(the nonresident tolling statute); §§ 78-27-24 and 25 (relevant 
sections of the Long-Arm Statute); and § 41-12-8 (the Nonresident 
Motorist Act). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature Of Action, 
This is a medical malpractice action. Plaintiff, 
Lorraine Cowgill, is the mother of the decedent, Shannon Millsap, 
and the guardian a<3 litem of Elizabeth Ann Millsap, the decedent's 
minor daughter. Defendant, Alan Sokolow, M. D., is a physician 
living in Connecticut who, at the time of the alleged negligence, 
was a physician in residency at L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake 
City. 
Shannon Millsap died on April 11, 1980, after suffering 
a stroke-like neurological event on the evening of April 9, 
1980. She had been examined on the morning of that day by defendant 
and another physician at the L.D.S. Hospital emergency room, 
where she had gone with complaints of persistent facial headaches 
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and blurred vision. After being seen by the physicians and 
given diagnostic tests, she was discharged and went home. 
Plaintiff alleges that defendant was negligent in 
failing to perform an adequate neurological examination on 
Ms. Millsap, in not scheduling her for an examination that day 
by a neurologist, in prescribing inappropriate medications, 
and, generally, in discharging Ms. Millsap when he should have 
admitted her. [See, Second Amended Complaint, Record at 16.] 
II, Course Of Proceedings. 
The Complaint was filed against Dr. Sokolow and L.D.S. 
Hospital on June 16, 1983. [R. 2] An Amended Complaint was 
filed on March 5, 1984. [R. 6] Shortly thereafter, Dr. Sokolow 
was served with process at his home in Connecticut, whereupon 
he moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint on the ground that 
it contained a monetary prayer for relief prohibited by § 78-14-7. 
The parties stipulated that a Second Amended Complaint could 
be filed without the objectionable demand, and it was so filed 
on March 30, 1984. [R. 16] 
All claims against L.D.S. Hospital were voluntarily 
dismissed with prejudice by plaintiff in April 1984, for the 
stated reason that her claims against that defendant had been 
settled and compromised. This left Dr. Sokolow as the sole 
defendant. [R. 45] 
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Defendant took the deposition of plaintiff on June 
22, 1984. The parties exchanged written discovery requests 
[R. 25, 32, 47, 57] and defendant then moved for summary judgment 
on the ground that this action was barred by the applicable 
two-year statute of limitations, § 78-14-4. [R. 40] The basis 
for the motion was that plaintiff had admitted discovery of 
her "injury" by mid-summer of 1980 -- when she had received 
an informed medical opinion that there had been negligence --
yet delayed in commencing this suit until well more than two 
years thereafter. 2/ 
Plaintiff did not dispute that she had discovered < 
her "injury" more than two years before commencing this action. 
[See, Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, R. 81 and Rule 2(h) ( 
i 
2/ Throughout the proceedings below, defendant took March 
5, 1984, to be the date of the commencement of the action 
against him, under a mistaken belief that he was not named 
as a party in the original Complaint since he was not served 
with it. It is now clear that defendant was a party in 
the original Complaint, filed June 16, 1983, and that this 
earlier date should be taken as the "commencement" date. 
It makes no difference to the limitations issue since June 
16, 1983, is also more than two years after the admitted 
date of discovery. 
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Third Judicial Court Rules of Practice.3/] Nor does she dispute 
it here. Rather, plaintiff contends that the statute of limitations 
is tolled by § 78-12-35 because defendant was continuously absent 
from Utah from May 1980 until the present. 
III. Disposition In Lower Court. 
The lower court, Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, 
rejected plaintiff's contention that the limitations period 
was tolled by § 78-12-35 and, accordingly, entered judgment 
in favor of defendant on January 29, 1985. [Order Granting 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Addendum I and R. 92] 
This appeal followed. 
IV. Relevant Facts. 
The following facts are relevant to the issue presented 
for review in this appeal: 
1. This is a "Malpractice Action Against a 
Health Care Provider," as that phrase is defined by 
§ 78-14-3(29). As such, a two-year statute of limitations 
running from the date of discovery of the injury applies. 
§ 78-14-4; Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Utah 1979). 
3/ Rule 2(h) requires an opposition memorandum to concisely 
dispute any material facts alleged by the movant to be 
undisputed or waive the point. 
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2. Plaintiff discovered her injury not later 
than mid-summer of 1980. [See discussion, supra] 
3. This action was commenced on June 16, 1983. 
[Complaint, R. 2] 
4. Defendant, a resident of Utah as of the 
date of the alleged negligence, April 9, 1980, moved 
in May of that year to New York State and, later, 
to Connecticut. He has not been a resident or physically 
present in Utah since that time. [Defendant Sokolow1s 
Answer to Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, R. 20; 
Defendant's Answers to Plaintiff's First Set of Requests 
for Admissions and Interrogatories, Addendum to Appellant's 
Brief] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Section 78-12-35 provides: 
Effect of absence from state. If when 
a cause of action accrues against a person 
when [sic] he is out of the state, the action 
may be commenced within the term herein 
limited after his return to the state; and 
if after a cause of action accrues he departs 
from the state, the time of his absence 
is not part of the time limited for the 
commencement of the action. 
The issue on this appeal is a simple one: If § 78-12-35 
tolls the statute of limitations, this action was timely commenced 
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and the lower court should be reversed. If it does not, the 
action is barred and the lower court should be affirmed. 
Defendant's contention, and the view of the lower 
court, is that § 78-12-35 applies only when a defendant is both 
physically absent from this state and not subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of its courts. That interpretation of the statute 
has already been reached by this Court where personal jurisdiction 
over a nonresident defendant was obtained under the Nonresident 
Motorist Act, § 41-12-8. There exists no principled distinction 
between that and personal jurisdiction obtained under the Long-Arm 
Statute, § 78-27-22 e_t seq. In either case, no reason to toll 
the limitations statute exists. 
ARGUMENT 
SECTION 78-12-35 ONLY APPLIES WHEN A PROSPECTIVE DEFENDANT 
IS BOTH PHYSICALLY ABSENT FROM THIS STATE AND NOT 
SUBJECT TO THE PERSONAL JURISDICTION OF ITS COURTS, 
I. This Court has Previously Held that § 78-12-35 
Requires Both Physical Absence and Non-Amenability 
to Service of Process, 
This Court has already held that § 78-12-35 is not 
to be read literally but, rather, with a view to its intended 
purpose. In Snyder v. Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.2d 915 (1964), 
Mrs. Snyder, a Utah resident, sued defendants, California residents, 
for personal injuries she suffered in a Utah County auto accident. 
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Her Complaint was filed three days past the expiration date 
of the four-year statute of limitations. Jurisdiction over 
defendants was obtained in accordance with the Nonresident 
Motorist Act, which authorizes service of process upon non-
resident motorists by serving the Secretary of State, who is 
deemed to be the "agent" of nonresident motorists for that pur-
pose. 
Mrs. Snyder contended that § 78-12-35 tolled the limita-
tions statute since defendants had returned home to California 
shortly after the accident and had not been back. This Court, 
in an opinion written by Justice Crockett, reversed the lower 
court's decision and ordered the action dismissed as untimely. 
The "obvious objective" of § 78-12-35, according to the Court, 
was to prevent a prospective defendant from depriving a plaintiff 
of the opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the 
state until the limitations period had expired. 15 Utah 2d 
at 256, 390 P.2d at 916. 
Since defendants had a fictitious agent in Utah pro-
cess could have been served. They were not, thus, "absent" 
in the sense contemplated by the statute; that is, unavailable 
for service of process. Nothing prevented Mrs. Snyder from 
serving them at any time she desired and there existed no reason 
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for tolling the running of the statute. "When the reason for 
the rule is gone, the rule should vanish with it." Id.4/ 
Any other interpretation of § 78-12-35, said the Court, 
would have allowed the claim to rest in suspense for an indeterminate 
number of years, even though Mrs. Snyder could have served process 
whenever she wanted to. That result would have comported with 
neither reason nor justice. Id.5/ 
Utah's Long-Arm Statute, § 78-27-22 e_t seq. , provides 
that any person causing tortious injury in Utah is subject to 
the personal jurisdiction of its courts. § 78-27-24(3). Service 
of process upon such a person is made in accordance with Rule 
4, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Personal service outside 
4/ Unspoken in the opinion is .what the "reason" for the tolling 
statute is: the inability to obtain personal jurisdiction 
over nonresidents who committed torts in this state until 
the advent of the "ficticious agent" and "long-arm" statutes. 
As of 1903, the date § 78-12-35's predecessor was enacted, 
a defendant could apparently avoid a civil suit by leaving 
the state until the statute of limitations expired. See, 
Comp. Laws 1907, § 2888. 
5/ Overruling Keith O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 51 Utah 227, 169 
P. 954 (1917); Buell v. Duchesne Mercantile Co., 64 Utah 
391, 231 P. 123 (1924); and Seeley v. Cowley, 12 Utah 2d 
252, 365 P.2d 63 (Utah 1961). 
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the state has the same force and effect as if served in Utah. 
Id. This defendant was, in fact, personally served with the 
Summons and the Amended Complaint in Connecticut in accordance 
with the Long-Arm Statute. 
Defendant has always been subject to the personal 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state for his alleged tort. 
He was never unavailable for service of process and never "absent" 
in the sense contemplated by § 78-12-35. Nothing prevented 
plaintiff from suing him before the expiration of the limitations 
period. As in Snyder, there existed no reason for tolling the 
limitations statute. 
Where lies the distinction between nonresidents subject 
to jurisdiction under the Nonresident Motorist Act and nonresidents 
subject to jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute? Nothing 
in either instance prevents a timely filing of suit. The method 
of service of process -- ficticious agent or personal service 
— is unimportant. The fact that personal jurisdiction exists 
is determinative. 
II. Other Jurisdictions That Have Considered Similar 
Tolling Statutes Generally Agree That Lack Of 
Personal Jurisdiction Is A Prerequisite For Tolling. 
There are many reported decisions from other courts 
that have considered this issue. See, generally, Annot., 55 
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A.L.R.3d 1158 (1974) and 51 Am. Jur. 2d, Limitation of Actions 
§§ 154-160 (1970).6/ 
Most courts agree that tolling or "savings" statutes 
like § 78-12-35 do not apply if a prospective defendant is physically 
absent from a state but subject to service of process. For 
example, see, Beedie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713, 715 (Mont. 1980) 
(Holding that a Montana statute nearly identical to § 78-12-35 
was not tolled by the nonresidence of a defendant subject to 
process under the Montana Long-Arm Statute.); Bray v. Bayles, 
618 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. 1980) (A similar holding under Kansas 
statutes.); Williams v. Malone, 592 S.W.2d 879, 881 (Mo. App. 1980) 
(Missouri Long-Arm Statute similarly interpreted.); Lipe v. Javelin 
Tire Co., Inc., 536 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1975) (Nearly identical 
tolling and long-arm statutes in the Idaho Code are interpreted.); 
and Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224, 227 (Wash. 1969). 
I n
 Summerrise v. Stephens, the Washington Supreme 
Court held that a medical malpractice action was not tolled 
6/ An extensive, but not exhaustive, compilation of the reported 
decisions is found in Addendum III. 
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by Washington's nonresident t o l l i n g s t a t u t e where the defendant 
d o c t o r , al though a nonres ident , was always subject to personal 
service under the Washington Long-Arm S ta tu t e , The Court indicated 
t h a t a d e f e n d a n t ' s absence from the s t a t e must be such tha t 
process could not be served upon him: 
The purpose of the s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s 
i s to compel ac t ions to be commenced wi th in 
what the l e g i s l a t u r e deemed to be a reasonable 
time, and not postponed i n d e f i n i t e l y . However, 
t h e s t a t u t e ' s o p e r a t i o n could be t o l l e d 
for what the l e g i s l a t u r e regarded as a good 
r ea son , i . e . , the i n a b i l i t y to get personal 
s e r v i c e on a defendant by r e a s o n of h i s 
absence from the s t a t e . That reason having 
been removed in c e r t a i n c l a s s e s of c a s e s 
by the Long-Arm S t a t u t e , the t o l l i ng provision 
in such cases i s no longer n e c e s s a r y , and 
t h e s t a t u t e of l i m i t a t i o n s should again 
be permitted to perform i t s purpose of expediting 
l i t i g a t i o n . 
There i s a compelling considerat ion of public 
p o l i c y a l s o f avo r ing the answer we have 
g iven . To hold otherwise would allow s u i t s 
against nonresidents of the s t a t e upon whom 
personal service can be obtained to be postponed 
i n d e f i n i t e l y . The e v i l r e s u l t s of long 
delay are too obvious to require r e c i t a t i o n . 
We should not a s c r i b e to the l e g i s l a t u r e 
an in ten t which would lead to such unfortunate 
consequences. 
454 P.2d at 227. ( c i t a t i o n s omi t ted) . 
The Court noted t h a t i t s e a r l i e r d e c i s i o n in Smith 
v. Forty Mill ion, I n c . , 395 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964), which reached 
the same r e s u l t in the c o n t e x t of the Washington. Nonresident 
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Motorist Statute, was not necessarily controlling but was highly 
persuasive: 
There is no such method of in-state service 
under [the Washington Long-Arm Statute]. 
However, there is the requirement of personal 
service of a summons and complaint on the 
tortfeasor who has left the state, which 
is a much surer guarantee of notice and 
due process than the more synthetic procedures 
provided by the statute under consideration 
in Smith v. Forty Million, Inc.. 
The cases upholding the result reached in 
Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., supra, could 
now be said to be "legion." It is interesting 
to note that the reasoning in most of the 
opinions hinges not on the service of some 
public official in the state, but rather 
upon the proposition that a tolling statute 
does not apply when a plaintiff has available 
to him a means of securing personal service 
on a defendant which will make possible 
a personal judgment against him. 
454 P.2d at 228. Accord, Adm'r of Reed v. Rosenfield, 51 A.2d 
189, 191 (Vt. 1947) ; Benally v. Pigman, 429 P. 2d 6 48, 650 (N.M. 1967) 
and authorities cited in Addendum III(A). 
There is some authority to the contrary. See, Addendum 
III(B). It has, however, been variously characterized by some 
as a "relatively small and ever-diminishing minority view," 
Tarter v. Insco, 550 P. 2d 905, 907 (Wyo. 1976), and as "comparatively 
miniscule," Summerrise v. Stephens, supra, 454 P.2d at 227 n.4. 
See, for example, Duke University v. Chestnut, 221 S.E.2d 895 
(N. C. 1976) and Dicker v. Binkley, 555 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. 
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App. 1977)7/. These cases tend to construe the tolling statutes 
literally, without considering the purpose behind them, and 
characterize the issue as one for the legislature to deal with. 
There are also those cases which involve tolling statutes with 
provisions that are distinguishable from § 78-12-35. See, Addendum 
III(B). 
III. The Better Interpretation Of § 78-12-35 is That 
It Does Not Toll A Limitations Statute Unless 
The Prospective Defendant Is Not Amenable To 
Process. 
Whether the Snyder decision is controlling or not, 
plaintiff's interpretation would mean that the statute of limitations 
would never expire as to a medical malpractice claim filed against 
a nonresident doctor.8/ it may safely be assumed that many 
defendants, such as those out-of-state doctors who do their 
7/ Texas has held, however, that the tolling statute does 
not toll the Texas medical malpractice statute of limitations 
since the latter statute shows a clear legislative intent 
that it not be tolled under any circumstance except those 
expressly permitted. Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1984). Our § 78-14-4 exhibits a similar intent. 
8/
 A s to those defendants that intentionally evade service, 
an exception could be made. See, for example, Williams 
v. Malone, supra, 589 S.W.2d at 882. 
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residencies in Utah, may leave Utah and never return. As this 
Court noted in Snyder; 
Under the interpretation and application 
of our statute contended for by the plaintiff, 
that the defendant's absence from the state 
tolled the running of the statute of limitations, 
an action against a nonresident motorist 
would practically never be outlawed. A 
purported claim could rest in suspense and 
an action could be commenced 10, 20 or any 
number of years after its origin, even though 
the plaintiff could have sued and served 
process anytime he desired. It seems to 
us that such a result would comport with 
neither reason nor justice. Nor would it 
harmonize with the policy of the law of 
allowing a reasonable time for the bringing 
of an action, but of providing a definite 
limitation of time in which it must be brought 
or the matter be put at rest. 
15 Utah 2d at 256, 390 P.2d at 916. 
That policy is expressly set forth in the Health Care 
Malpractice Act at § 78-14-2: 
In enacting this act, it is the purpose 
of the legislature to provide a reasonable 
time in which actions may be commenced against 
health care providers while limiting that 
time to a specific period for which professional 
liability insurance premiums can be reasonably 
and accurately calculated; and to provide 
other procedural changes to expedite early 
evaluation and settlement of claims. 
Statutes of limitations are "pragmatic devices to 
save courts from stale claim litigation and spare citizens from 
having to defend when memories have faded, witnesses are unavailable 
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by death or disappearance and evidence is lost." Duke v. Housen, 
589 P.2d 334, 340 (Wyo. 1979). That policy is poorly served 
by tolling a limitations statute when there exists no reason 
to do so. 
CONCLOSION 
At no time did this plaintiff have to look to the 
tolling statute for help while seeking a method to serve defendant. 
The method she did eventually use could have been used earlier. 
The purpose of § 78-12-35 is to prevent the statute of limitations 
from running when the courts of this state cannot acquire personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant. When delay is not necessary, 
it should not be permitted. Defendant, therefore, asks that 
the decision of the lower court granting summary judgment in 
his favor be affirmed. 
DATED this 2^6-day of August, 1985. 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
^nmas (m^t^ 
Stewar t M. Hanson, J r . , Esq. 
F r a n c i s J . Carney, Esq. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing 
Brief of Respondent were served this day of August, 1985, 
by depositing them in the U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, to: 
Frank M. Wells, Esq. 
Attorney for Appellant 
2564 Washington Boulevard 
Suite #4 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
**T/itoJC.-S t*n >*y 
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS 
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ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq* (1356) 
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581) 
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG & 
HANSON 
175 South West Temple 
Seventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480 
Telephone: (801) 532-7300 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT CODRT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ELIZABETH ANN MILLSAP, by 
and through her guardian ad ) ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
Litem, LORRAINE COWGILL, ) MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, ) 
-vs- ) HON. JOHN A. ROKICH 
ALAN SOKOLOW, M. D., ) Civil No. C-83-4562 
Defendant. ) 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing before the Court, Honorable John A. Rokich presiding, 
on January 14, 1985. Francis J. Carney, Esq. appeared on behalf 
of defendant; Frank M. Wells, Esq. appeared on behalf of plaintiff. 
The Court, having read the respective memoranda submitted 
by counsel for the parties, having heard the arguments of counsel, 
" S; '-'r n-r-
J&L^C-
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and being otherwise advised in the premises , concludes that 
th i s action is barred by the applicable s ta tu te of l imi ta t ions , 
§ 78-14-4, Utah Code Ann. (1953) and, t h e r e f o r e , en te rs i t s 
Order as follows: 
I t is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment shall be, and hereby is, granted and that 
judgment for defendant, Alan Sokolow, M. D. , and against plaintiff, 
Elizabeth A. Millsap, by and through her guardian ad_ 1 item, 
Lorraine Cowgill, shall be, and hereby is, entered, no cause 
of action. 
MADE AND ENTERED &9 day of January, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
s-A<y£ A\\<^Ji^J^ 
HONORABLE JOHN A.^ROKICH 
trict Judge 
ATTF3T 
H. D!XOi-Hl^ r:.EY 
- 2 -
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II 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
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7*1+4. 
(1) N o maipricnct action against a health a r c 
provider nay be brought- unless it is 
within two yean titer the plaintiff or 
discovers, or through the use rrasnnahst rifliarncc 
should* hive* discovered the injury, whichever first 
occurs, bos not to exceed four yrari efli.r the date 
ofj the alleged act, omission, neglect or ccxorrence, 
ascent that 
(a) in atv action when the l i l ffrtnn against 
the health c a n provider is that a* foreign, object 
has been wroosfoily left within, & patient's body, 
the dainr shall be barred unless commenced within 
one year after the piamnff or patient discovers, or 
through the: use of-reasonable diligence should 
have discovered, the cogence of the foreign object 
wrongfully left in the patient*! body* whichever 
f im ocean; and 
(b) in W action whan it is iflfged that a 
MBS prevented from discovering 
the pan of.. health c a n provider 
. « _ _ _ thee Iwaiih c a n provider has, affliiiiaiiveiy 
acted to fraudulently conceal th*> alleged 
the dah» shall be- barred- unless* 
one year after the* pferoadtT or 
^•III ~^ —». or throngh the use -of reasooahie 
fffligrnra, shonld have* ileum led the? fraudulent 
(Z) The provisions or a m section shall apply to 
ail persons, regardless of tnmonty or other legal 
disability under section 7S-12»36 or any other 
provision of the law, and shall apply lcuuei.uvfly 
to all. persons,. pamnifTihips, associatioos and 
corporations and to all health.can providers and 
to all malpractice actions against health can 
providers based upon alleged personal injuries 
which occurred prior to the effective date1 of this 
sec; provided, however, that any action which 
under former law could have been commenced 
after the effective date of this act may be 
oanmrnrsd onry within the iineiarjecd portion of 
tSDC allowed under former law; but any action 
which under former law could have been 
commenced more than four yean after the 
effective-date of this act may be commenced onry 
within, four yean after the effective date of this 
7M7-24. Javisdietlon over noeniideati - Acts 
Any person, notwithstanding section 16-10-102, 
whether* or not a citizen or resident of this state, 
who in. person or through an agent does any of the 
following enumerated acts, submits himself, and if 
an individual, his personal representative, to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any 
daim arising from: 
(1) The transaction of any business within this 
state; 
(2) Contracting to supply services ot goods in 
this state; 
(3) The causing of any injury within this state 
whether tortious or by breach of warranty; 
(4) The ownership, use, or possession of any real 
estate situated in this state; 
(5) Contracting to insure any person, property or 
risk located within this state at the time of 
divorce and 
in this* 
state of a matrimonial domicile u the rime the 
daim arose or the conrnnssion in this state of the 
act giving rise to the daim; or 
(7) The own-mission of sexual inter course within 
this state which gives rise to a peiermry suit under 
Chapter 45a, Title 7S, to determine paternity for 
the purpose of »•*•hK«*™»f respemibiiity for child 
support* net 
elprecaat. 
Service of process on any party outside.the state 
may be made pursuant to the apphcaok provisions 
of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
of summons and of a copy of the 
if any, may also be made upon any 
without this state by any individual 
ovus 21 yean j f age, am a party to the action, 
with the same force and effect as though the 
summons had been personally served within this 
state. No order of court is required. An affidavit 
of the server shall be filed with the court stating 
the time, manner and place of service. The court 
may consider the affidavit, or any other competent 
proofs, in detenmmng whether proper service has 
been made. 
Nothing contained'tin this act shall be construed 
to limit or affect the right to serve process in any 
other manner provided by law. tse» 
7M2-35. Effect -ofi 
If when a cause of action accrues against a 
person when be is out of the state, the action may 
be "—•••»—»—* within the. term herem-limited after 
his return to* the state; and i f after a cause of 
action accrues he departs from the state,•• the time 
of his-absence is not part of the time limited for 
thecocmneocememoftbe srrvwr . m& 
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4*»12-*V Neeaaatdeata • Effect <rf aae-of «aer 
k t e a m v B Q M M ^ M ^ M . »n^- VMVMW^K. Vf AM^^AP A ^ 
The* oat' and operation by t< aoareaident or hk 
eaaas*. or oCa, resident who has* departed from the 
staar of Utaev of a motor vchide upon and- over, the 
hiahways. of thta- state, s&all ba deemed an 
tppoaaooaeot by tba nonresident*, or* a resident who 
bad departed from the- stale-of Utah, of the 
Hennmant aoverikir aa hia mat and lawful attorney 
ops*, whoa* any- be served* alL Jeani* prooee* i * any 
MTkei or proceediiif^ laainet. him arising from, the • 
oae o^ .operation ot a,motor vehicle over- the 
hlajiwaya of thai state: resolnn* in damaajea or toes. 
' to* peraoer- or* property and said* oar or 
. theft or * sigmfkanoo- of Ida, agreement thar 
ksfceiL, in any actice^ anainar hhn whichcis so 
; be of the same legal force, and validity-is if 
upon hhn personally within thtf state* 
Servica of process shaiTbc made by serving a copy 
txpQBT- the iWiHemuit gtiveroorror* by filing a' copy* in 
Ua offiee with, payment of a S2 fee; Plaintiff shall, 
within; ten daya after service of process, send notice 
thereof*, together with, piamtifrs affidavit of 
nwnHiiina with- thai- act, to the defendant' by 
regjetarad mafl at his last known address. 
T3MP conrt in which the action • is. pending may 
order* any continuance necessary to afford the 
reaaonabie opportunity to defend the 
; 90 days from the data of filing 
the-acdnn m coart^Tbe SZ fee paid by the da** * -
to die nemmanr gpvernot shall be taxed as contif 
he prevails, in the suit. The lieutenant govern* 
shall keei * record of ail procenea *nved #fe*g 
shall show the day and hoes of service; Ugj 
! 
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS 
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SUMMARY OF DECISIONS 
A. Decisions holding that tolling statutes do not 
apply where service of process can be obtained. 
Alabama 
Peters v. Tuell Dairy Co., 35 So.2d 344 (Ala. 1948): Where 
service of process could have been secured on nonresident 
defendants under statute providing for service on Secretary 
of State, statute of limitations not tolled. 
Alaska 
Byrne v. Ogle, 488 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1971): Tolling statute 
does not toll statute of limitations in action against 
motorist who moved from the state where the defendant is 
subject to substituted service of process under Nonresident 
Motorist Statute. 
Arizona 
Hawkinson Tire Co. v. Paul E. Hawkinson Co., 476 P.2d 864 
(1970), aff!d, 485 P.2d 825 (1971): Where service of process 
on foreign corporation could be effected by constructive 
service, corporation was not "absent" within the meaning 
of the tolling statute and the statute of limitations was 
not tolled. 
Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609 (1974): Statute of limitations 
not tolled during defendant's absence from the state where 
process could have been served in the state or under the 
Long-Arm Statute. 
California 
Dovie v. Hibler, 62 Cal. Rptr. 228 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967): 
Where defendant in an automobile accident has California 
driver's license and owns a vehile registered in California, 
the statute of limitations is not tolled by his absence 
from the state, so long as he can be located through exercise 
of reasonable diligence. 
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Connecticut 
Colello v. Sundquist, 137 F. Supp. 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1955): 
Action by New Jersey plaintiffs against New York resident 
for injuries suffered in Connecticut auto accident. Applying 
Connecticut law, the court held that the tolling statute 
did not apply despite defendant's absence from the state 
where service of process on state officer was available 
to plaintiff. 
Coombs v. Darling, 166 A. 70 (Conn. 1933): Absence from 
the state did not toll the statute of limitations where 
substituted service of process upon state officer is available 
to establish jurisdiction. 
Tublitz v. Hirschfeld, 118 F.2d 29 (2nd Cir. 1941): Tolling 
statute did not toll statute of limitations where service 
could have been made on state officer and that officer 
was required to notify nonresident defendant in writing. 
Delaware 
Hurwitch v. Adams, 151 A. 2d 286, aff'd, 155 A. 2d 591 (Del. 
Supr. Ct. 1959): In action for injuries sustained in auto 
accident, nonresident defendant was not "out of the state" 
within meaning of statute tolling statute of limitations 
since defendant could have been served with process by 
service on Secretary of State. 
Florida 
Fernon v. Itkin, 476 F. Supp. 1 (M.D. Fla 1977): In a 
medical malpractice action where the out-of-state defendant 
was amenable to service of process, the applicable statute 
of limitations was not tolled. 
Friday v. Newman, 183 So.2d 25 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1966): 
Absence of the defendant from the state tolls the running 
of the statute of limitations except if service of process 
can be made, either actual or substituted. 
Georgia 
Smith v. Griggs, 296 S.E.2d 87 (Ga. App. 1982): Where 
a defendant moves from the state after an auto accident 
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in Georgia, its courts have jurisdiction under the Long-Arm 
Statute and the tolling statute does not toll statute of 
limitations so long as process can be lawfully served. 
Idaho 
Blankenship v. Myers, 544 P.2d 314 (Idaho 1975): Tolling 
statute does not toll running of statute of limitations 
during defendant's absence from state where jurisdiction 
of defendant may be had under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291 (1975): Expressly 
overruling Staten v. Weiss, 308 P.2d 1021 (1957) , and impliedly 
overruling Anthes v. Anthes, 121 P. 533 (1912): Where 
foreign corporate defendant can be served with process 
outside the state under the Long-Arm Statute and can be 
located with reasonably diligent efforts for service, statute 
of limitations is not tolled. 
Fullmer v. Sloan's Sporting Goods Co., 277 F. Supp. 995 
(S.D.N.Y. 1967): In construing Idaho Long-Arm Statute 
and tolling statute, New York defendant was subject to 
service under Long-Arm Statute, therefore, statute of limitations 
was not tolled. 
Illinois 
Higgenbottom v. Van Veiga, 375 N.E.2d 454 (111. App. 1978): 
Where defendant is subject to jurisdiction pursuant to 
the Long-Arm Statute, he has not departed from the state 
within the meaning of the statute tolling the statute of 
limitations. 
Indiana 
American States Ins. Co. v. Williams, 278 N.S.2d 295 (Ind. 
App. 1972 ): Statute of limitations not tolled during defendant' s 
nonresidence where defendant was at all times amenable 
to service of process under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Dague v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 513 F. Supp. 19 (D. Ind. 1980): 
In wrongful death action under Indiana Products Liability 
Act, statute of limitations not tolled by tolling statute 
against out-of-state defendant so long as there is a statutory 
agent for service of process. 
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Iowa 
Burkhardtv. Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149 (D. Iowa 1961): Applicable 
statute of limtations not tolled where nonresident defendants 
are subject to service of process under Nonresident Motorist 
Service Act. 
Kokenge v. Holthaus, 52 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1952): Where 
nonresident defendants are subject to service of process 
under the Nonresident Motorist Service Act, applicable 
statutes of limitation are not tolled. 
Kansas 
Brayv. Bayles, 618 P. 2d 807 (Kan. 1980): In medical malpractice 
action, "absence" from state which will toll running of 
statute of limitations requires that defendant be beyond 
reach of service of process under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Carter v. Kretschmer, 577 P.2d 1211 (Kan. 1978): Statute 
of limitations not tolled when defendant departs state 
after auto accident where there was an agent within the 
state for service of process or where plaintiff could have 
been served personally under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Maryland 
Jolivet v. Elkins, 386 F. Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1974): Statute 
of limitations was not tolled during defendants1 absence 
from the state, since under the Long-Arm Statute they were 
not beyond the reach of the court. 
Massachusetts 
Daigle v. Leavitt, 283 N.Y.S.2d 328 (N.Y. App. 1967): 
In an action for injuries sustained in an auto accident, 
brought by Connecticut residents against New York defendants 
in a New York court for Massachusetts accident, under Massa-
chusetts law, where plaintiffs could have served nonresident ( 
motorist by substituted service of process, statute of 
limitations is not tolled. 
Walsh v. Ogorzalek, 361 N.E.2d 1247 (Mass. 1977): Where 
service of process upon Registrar of Motor Vehicles is 
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available under the Nonresident Motorist Statute, tolling 
statute does not toll the period of limitations. 
Michigan 
Hommel v. Bettison, 107 N.W.2d 887 (Mich, 1961): Statute 
of limitations is not tolled during absence from the state 
of nonresident motorist since personal jurisdiction over 
defendant was possible through service on the Secretary 
of State. 
Minnesota 
Long v. Moore, 204 N.W.2d 641 (Minn. 1974): Where defendant 
moved from state after auto accident, statute of limitations 
was not tolled where defendant remained amenable to personal 
jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Mississippi 
Gulf National Bank v. King, 362 So.2d 1253 (Miss. 1978): 
If plaintiff can obtain process on nonresident defendant 
under the Long-Arm Statute, statute of limitations will 
not be tolled during absence. Plaintiff has the burden 
to show duration of absence and to show that defendant 
could not be served under any of means provided by the 
Long-Arm Statute. 
Missouri 
Bethke v. Bethke, 676 S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1984): General 
statute of limitations is not tolled when the defendant 
is subject to personal service of process in another state 
under the Missouri Long-Arm Statute. 
Williams v. Malone, 592 S.W.2d 879 (Mo. App. 1980): Statute 
of limitations is not tolled when defendant moves out of 
state where plaintiff knew defendants address and could 
have obtained jurisdiction by out-of-state personal service 
under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Montana 
State ex rel. McGhee v. District Court of Sixteenth Judicial 
District, 508 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1973): Statute of limitations 
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not tolled so long as defendant is subject to the jurisdiction 
of the Montana courts and is capable of being served during 
the entire time under provisions of the Long-Arm Statute. 
Beedie v. Shelley, 610 P.2d 713 (Mont. 1980): Statute 
of limitations not tolled because defendants were out-of-
state where defendants were at all times subject to the 
jurisdiction of the Montana courts. 
Nevada 
Brown v. Vonslid, 541 P.2d 528 (Nev. 1975): Tolling statute 
was not applicable to defendant physically absent from 
the state since the defendant was continuously subject 
to service under original divorce proceedings jurisdiction. 
Blotzke v. Christmas Tree, Inc., 499 P.2d 647 (Nev. 1972): 
VJhere a nonresident defendant contractor was continuously 
engaged in business in the state and amenable to substituted 
and personal service of process, the statute of limitations 
was not tolled. 
Seeley v. Illinois-California Exp., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 1307 
(D. Nev. 1982): Tolling statute did not toll applicable 
statute of limitations against a nonresident defendant 
so long as defendant was amenable to service of process 
through substituted service on the Secretary of State. 
Simmons v. Trivelpiece, 643 P.2d 1219 (Nev. 1982): Statute 
which tolls period of limitations during defendant's absence 
from the state did not apply when defendant is otherwise 
subject to service of process. 
New Hampshire 
Bolduc v. Richards, 142 A.2d 156 (N.H. 1958): Statute 
of limitations not tolled against defendants who moved 
out of state but were amenable to substituted service of 
process under Nonresident Motorist Act. < 
New Mexico 
Benally v. Pigman, 429 P.2d 648 (N.M. 1967): Tolling statute 
does not toll statute of limitations when defendant is 
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absent from the state if he can be served with process 
either actual or substituted, 
Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261 (N.M. 1973): Defendant's 
absence from state for much of limitation period did not 
toll the statute of limitations in absence of proof that 
defendant could not have been served under the Long-Arm 
Statute. 
New York 
Kirchen v. Ripton, 462 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup. 1983): In a 
medical malpractice and wrongful death action, the tolling 
statute does not apply where methods of acquiring personal 
jurisdiction other than by personal delivery within the 
state are available. 
Immediate v. St. John's Queen's Hospital, 410 N.Y.S.2d 
329 (1978): Medical malpractice statute of limitations 
not tolled because of defendant's continuous absence from 
the state since the claim arose out of tortious acts committed 
within the state and the defendant was at all times subject 
to New York jurisdiction under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Rescigno v. Montefiore Hospital and Medical Center, 409 
N.Y.S.2d 425 (1978): Under the Long-Arm Statute, New York 
courts had jurisdiction over defendant doctor during entire 
period in question and plaintiff could have obtained service 
of process by means other than personal delivery of Summons. 
Yarusso v. Arkotowicz, 393 N.Y.S.2d 968 (1977): Where 
statutory authority exists for obtaining personal jurisdiction 
by some manner other than personal service, statute of 
limitations is not tolled by defendant's absence from the 
state even though the plaintiff may, in fact, be unsuccessful 
in obtaining jurisdiction by the manner so provided. 
Oklahoma 
Jarchow v. Eder , 433 P.2d 942 (Okla. 1967): Defendant 
motorist's absence from the state does not toll statute 
of limitations even though statute provides for suspension 
of such limitations when defendant is absent from the state 
since plaintiff could have obtained substituted personal 
service under the Long-Arm Statute. 
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McCullough v. Boyd, 475 P.2d 610, (Okla. 1970): Statute 
of limitations not tolled when defendant moved 
from jurisdiction where plaintiff, under Nonresident Motorist 
Act, could have served process on the statutory agent. 
Oregon ^ 
Whittington v. Davis, 350 P. 2d 913 (Or. 1960): Where defendant 
moved from the jurisdiction, the statute of limitations 
was not tolled since the plaintiff could have exercised 
his statutory right to serve substituted process upon state 
officer under statute permitting such service. 
Rhode Island 
Rouse v. Connelly, 444 A.2d 850 (R. I. 1982): Since a 
nonresident motorist was subject to service of process 
in the state, the statute of limitations is not tolled 
during his absence from the state. 
South Dakota 
Russell v. Balcom Chemicals, Inc., 328 N.W.2d 476 (S. D. 1983): 
Statute of limitations was not tolled so long as defendant 
could have been served outside state under Long-Arm Statute 
and could have been located for service by reasonably diligent 
efforts. 
Tennessee 
Young v. Hicks, 250 F.2d 80 (8th Cir. 1957): Nonresidence 
of defendant did not toll Tennessee statute of limitations 
where process could be obtained by service on the Secretary 
of State. 
Texas 
Davis v. B. E. & K, Inc., 595 S.W.2d 895 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980): 
The statue of limitations was not tolled where defendant 
is not amenable to service under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App. 1984): Medical 
malpractice statute of limitations was not tolled by defendants 
absence from the state. 
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Vermont 
Reed v, Rosenfield, 51 A.2d 189 (Vt. 1947): Statute of 
limitations was not tolled in view of statute appointing 
Commissioner of Motor Vehicles as attorney for nonresident 
motorist. 
Virginia 
Bergman v. Turpin, 145 S.@.2d 135 (Va. 1965): Statute 
of limitations was not tolled by saving clause since defendant 
remained amenable to process. 
Duke v. Hausen, 589 P.2d 334 (Wyo. 1979) (applying Virginia 
law) : Where defendant could have been served with process 
under the Virginia Long-Arm Statute even though absent 
from the state, the statute of limitations was not tolled. 
Washington 
Bethel v. Sturmery 479 P.2d 131 (Wash. 1970): Statute 
of limitations was not tolled during defendant's absence 
from the state unless process cannot be served upon him. 
Summerrise v. Stephens, 454 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1969): Statute 
of limitations was not tolled during defendant's non-residence 
where service of process was possible at his out-of-state 
address under the Long-Arm Statute. 
Smith v. Forty Million, Inc., 395 P.2d 201 (Wash. 1964): 
Statute of limitations was not tolled by nonresident defendant's 
absence from the state where the plaintiff had the statutory 
right to serve summons on the Secretary of State. 
West Virginia 
Gray v. Johnson, 267 S.E.2d 615 (W. Va. 1980): Where the 
defendant is amenable to service of process under the Non-
resident Motorist Statute, his absence from the jurisdiction 
does not toll the statute of limitations. 
Wyoming 
T a r t e r v. I n s c o , 550 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1976): Defendant 's 
absence from the s t a t e did not t o l l the s t a t u t e of l imi t a t ions 
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where the he could have been served through substituted 
service on the Secretary of State under the Nonresident 
Motorist Statute. 
B. Decisions holding that tolling statutes apply 
regardless of availability of service of process. 
California 
Bigelow v. Smik, 85 Cal. Rptr. 613 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970): 
In an action for damages arising from an automobile accident 
where a nonresident motorist is amenable to service of 
process within the state under the statute authorizing 
service on authorized agent, and personal judgment can 
be obtained, the statute of limitations is not tolled. 
Dew v. Appleberry, 591 P.2d 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979): 
Statute of limitations was tolled during periods of defendant's 
absence from the state, even though defendant was at all 
times amenable to service of process. 
Garcia v. Flores, 134 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976): 
In an action arising from an auto accident in Mexico, even 
if the defendant could have been served while still in 
Mexico, the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until he returned from Mexico. 
Rothbun v. Superior Court, County of San Bernadino, 8 7 
Cal. Rptr. 568 (Cal. App. 1970): Statute of limitations 
was tolled where the nonresident defendant was subject 
to personal jurisdiction of the court, but could not be 
located with reasonably diligent efforts. 
Illinois 
Beckmire v. Ristokrat Clay Products Co., 343 N.E.2d 530 
(111. App. 1976): Statute of limitations tolled by the 
manufacturer's absence from the state despite the fact 
that the defendant manufacturer could have been served 
under the Long-Arm Statute. 
New Jersey 
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Abagnale, 234 A.2d 511 (N. J. Super. 
1967): Statute of limitations tolled during the period 
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when defendant was outside the state even though he was 
amenable to service of process by registered mail under 
the provisions of the Long-Arm Statute. 
North Carolina 
Duke University v. Chestnut, 221 S.E.2d 895 (N. C. App. 1976): 
In an action to recover for services rendered, the statute 
of limitations was tolled on the defendant who resided 
out of state at the time the cause of action arose and 
at all times thereafter. 
North Dakota 
Walsvik v. Brandel, 298 N.W.2d 375 (N. D. 1980): In a 
medical malpractice action against a nonresident defendant, 
the statute of limitations was tolled despite the availability 
of "long-arm" service of process. 
Ohio 
Bruck v. Eli Lilly & Co., 523 F. Supp. 480 (S. D. Ohio 
1981): In a wrongful death action against foreign defendant, 
the statute of limitations was tolled if defendant is amenable 
to personal service within the state even though substitute 
service may be had by means of the Long-Arm Statute. 
Couts v. Rose, 90 N.E.2d 139 (1950): The statute of limitations 
was tolled where defendant moved out of the state after 
an automobile accident even though the Nonresident Motorist 
Act subjected defendant to personal jurisdiction through 
service of process on the Secretary of State. 
Saunders v. Choi, 466 N.E.2d 889 (Ohio 1984): In a medical 
malpractice action brought under Ohio Statute, the statute 
of limitations is not tolled during the period that defendant 
is out of state since the express language of the savings 
clause provided that only actions brought under special 
sections are tolled when the defendant leaves the state. 
Vostach v. Axt, 510 F. Supp. 217 (S. D. Ohio 1981): In 
a medical malpractice action where the defendant moved 
from the state after the cause of action accrued, the statute 
of limitations was tolled since the defendant was not amenable 
to personal service within Ohio and, therefore, he is "out 
of state." 
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Dicker v. Binkley, 555 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ, App. 1977): 
"Presence" for purposes of avoiding tolling of limitations, 
means actual presence and not constructive presence. Tolling 
provisions apply notwithstanding availability of substituted 
service of process on a nonresident. 
Loomis v. Skillerns-Loomis Plaza, Inc.f 593 S.W.2d 409 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980): Time during defendant's absence 
from the state — for whatever purpose — will not be included 
when calculating the period of limitations. 
Sheen v. Monsanto Co., 569 F. Supp. 232 (S. D. Tex. 1983): 
Defendant was foreign corporation with authorized agent 
for service within the state. Defendant, therefore, was 
"present" and the statute of limitations was not tolled. 
Vaughn v. Deitz, 430 S.W.2d 487 (Tex. 1968): In an action 
for injuries sustained in an auto accident, where the defendant 
moved from the state, the action was tolled even though 
the plaintiff could have effectuated service of process. 
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